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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen bruker mikro-simuleringsmodellen MOSART til å studere fordelingsvirkningene av 
det reformerte pensjonssystemet i Folketrygden. Vi undersøker hvilken betydning ulike komponenter i 
det nye systemet - blant annet kjønnsnøytralt delingstall, omsorgsopptjening og arv av pensjons-
rettigheter mellom ektefeller - har for forskjellen mellom menns og kvinners pensjon og for den 
generelle ulikheten i pensjonsinntekt blant fremtidige alderspensjonister.  Våre analyser skiller seg på 
en rekke punkter fra tidligere studier av fordelingsvirkningene av det reformerte pensjonssystemet.  Vi 
konsentrerer oppmerksomheten om hvordan opptjeningsreglene i det nye pensjonssystemet slår ut for 
én fødselskohort, og vi ser på tre ulike utfall: fordelingen av pensjonsinntekt tidlig i pensjonerings-
fasen, fordelingen av gjennomsnittlig pensjonsinntekt over hele individets pensjoneringsforløp og 
summen av pensjonsinntekter over pensjoneringsforløpet. Videre ser vi, i motsetning til tidligere 
studier, ikke bare på fordelingen av individinntekt men også på ekvivalert husholdsinntekt og et 
(nyutviklet) individuelt inntektsbegrep som tar høyde for forskjell i stordriftsfordeler mellom enslige 
og gifte/samboende pensjonister.
1 Introduction
Due to enduring gender differences in labour market behaviour and outcomes,
marriage behaviour, and longevity, men and women have different outcomes in
national pension systems and have different interests with respect to pension design.
It is a universal finding from developed countries that male pensioners on average
receive higher benefits than female pensioners, have a lower poverty risk (OECD 2015:
170-171), and (on average) enjoy a higher level of economic well-being (Whiteford
and Kennedy 1995; Pedersen 1999: 289).
The so-called gender gap in pensions – typically measured as 1 minus the ratio
between average benefits received by female and male pensioners at a given point
in time - has received considerable attention in recent years from international
organisations like the OECD (OECD 2012)1 and the EU (European Commission
and Social Protection Committee 2015). According to the latest “Pension Adequacy
Report”, the weighted gender gap in pensions across the entire EU-27 population
of pensioners aged 65+ stood at 40% in 2011 (European Commission and Social
Protection Committee 2015: 151). According the same source, cross-national
variation is huge: from a gender pension gap of only 3% in Estonia to a gap of 46%
in the Netherlands.
The observed cross-national variation in the size of a gender gap in pensions can
be attributed to three main sources: a) variation in the historical labour market
behaviour of women and the male/female wage gap, b) variation in marriage and
divorce patterns and the scope of gender differences in longevity, and c) variation
in pension design that to a different degree allows differences in lifetime earnings
between men and women and demographic differences between the two genders to
be reflected in the distribution of pension benefits.
Gender differences in the participation in paid work and unpaid care-work is the
most important explanation for the universal existence of gender gap in pensions
and an important source of variation in size of the gap across time and space. In
most OECD-countries and in the Nordic welfare states in particular female labour
force participation has grown significantly since the 1950-60s – the heyday of the
male breadwinner model – and this will inevitably result in a gradual narrowing of
the gender gap in pensions in the long run. However, as long as women continue
to achieve lower life-time earnings than men – due to more career breaks, more
1See also https://www.oecd.org/gender/data/newoecddataandanalysisrevealingthewidegapinpen
sionbenefitsbetweenmenandwomen.htm
4
part-time work and lower wages - it is virtually inevitable that there will be a gender
gap in old age pensions as well.
Gender differences in longevity and marriage/partnering behaviour is another
source of gender differences in pension outcomes and economic well-being over
the retirement phase. The lower mortality and higher life-expectancy of women
compared to men imply that women can expect to spend more years and a larger
share of their life-course being dependent on the receipt of old age pensions. While
the average yearly benefits received by female pensioner are typically lower than
the benefits of men, the difference in lifetime benefits tend to be smaller, or even
be negative. The higher life-expectancy of women also means that the returns on
pension contributions typically are higher for women than for men (Stålberg et al.
2005), unless gender differences in longevity are somehow taken into consideration
in the benefit formula. It is also worth noting that the higher life-expectancy means
that women have a stronger interest in the payment of life-annuities as opposed to
lump-sum benefits or benefits paid out over a fixed number of years, and for the
same reason women have a stronger interest than men in generous indexation rules
(James 2012).
Another demographic difference between men and women with important implica-
tions for pensions and economic well-being in retirement is the propensity for women
to marry (or cohabitate with) partners who are somewhat older than themselves. In
Norway, the average age gap between spouses is currently 3.5 years.2 Together with
the difference in longevity, the age gap between spouses implies that females have a
far higher risk of becoming widows and females can expect to spend a longer part
of the retirement phase as single pensioners. As a consequence female pensioners
would enjoy a lower level of economic wellbeing compared to male pensioners, even
if their old age pension benefits were equal to those of men. In other words, women
have a stronger interest than men in pension mechanisms or benefit components
that compensate widows/widowers for the loss of economies of scale that come with
sharing expenses in a household.
Of course these gender differences in labour market behaviour and in demographic
variables do not directly decide the final outcome in retirement. Instead they interact
with features of the pension system to produce a particular distribution of pensions
and economic wellbeing among a generation of old age pensioners. National pension
systems in developed economies have developed historically from two rather different
traditions: a Bismarckian approach relying on earnings-related social insurance and
a Beveridgeian approach to pension provision concentrating on providing a minimum
2http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/tiden-gaar-aldersforskjellen-bestaar.
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income guarantee in old age through flat-rate or means-tested benefits (Pedersen
1999).
While there is (virtually) no gender gap in public pension benefits in countries
following a Beveridgeian approach to pension provision with flat-rate or means-tested
benefits only (like the Netherlands, Denmark and Iceland), a considerable gender gap
is likely to emerge in countries following a Bismarckian social insurance approach
where public pension benefits are more or less tightly linked to prior contributions
and lifetime earnings. The gender gap tends to be particularly large in countries
that do not offer any effective minimum provision to individuals (married women)
who have had low or no earnings over the life-course – like the continental European
countries including Germany, Austria and Italy. In the first group of Beveridgeian
countries, private occupational pensions tend to play a large role, and when these
are taken into consideration a significant gender gap tends to emerge also in these
countries. In fact the Netherlands appears to have the highest gender gap in total
pension benefits among the EU-27 countries while the gender gap is relatively low
in Denmark (European Commission and Social Protection Committee 2015: 151).
The Norwegian public pension system has since the late 1960s belonged to an
intermediate group of countries combining the provision of (relatively generous)
minimum benefits to all elderly through a combination of flat-rate and targeted
benefits with an earnings-related second tier. The earnings-related second tier
is based on a point system in which a full pension is achieved after 40 years of
participation in gainful work and in which benefits were calculated on the 20 best
earnings-years.
Currently the gender gap in public pension benefits measured over the present
generation of old age pensioners amounts to 27% (the average benefits of female
pensioners are 73% of the average benefits received by males) (Claus et al. 2013),
and the figure is only slightly higher when taking account also of supplementary
occupational pensions. The gender gap in pensions has been declining over the last
decade and was heading for a further gradual decline over the coming decades, due
to the massive entry of women into the labour force from the 1970s onwards and
the resulting comparatively high labour force participation rates among younger
generations of Norwegian women (Koren 2012). It has been estimated that the
gender gap in pensions would decline further to about 15 percent in 2050 if the
old system had been continued without any changes in the benefit formula (NOU
2004:1; Christensen et al. 2012).
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2 The Norwegian pension reform
Over a period of ten years, between 2001 and 2011, a major pension reform was
prepared, enacted and put into force. In the policy making process leading up to
the enactment of the reform in 2009, the potential consequences for the gender gap
in pensions and gender equality more generally was a hotly debated topic (Bay et al.
2015).
The Norwegian reform is strongly inspired by the path-breaking Swedish pension
reform and based on the Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) approach. The
accrual of pension rights will in the new system take place continuously over the
life-course with a fixed rate (in the Norwegian case) of 18.1 percent of annual
earnings up to a ceiling at approximately 1.3 times the average fulltime wage. The
accumulated deposits on individual notional accounts will eventually be transferred
into an annuity upon retirement based on the individual’s age at take-up and the
remaining life expectancy of the cohort to which the individual belongs.
A key rationale for abandoning traditional defined benefit systems and replacing
them with the NDC framework is to achieve a closer and more transparent link
between lifetime earnings and lifetime contributions on the one hand and (expected)
pension benefits on the other. This is assumed to improve both the fairness and
the economic sustainability of the system. Arguably, fairness is enhanced by re-
moving “opaque” and sometimes directly regressive redistributive elements found
in traditional systems (Myles 2002, Eriksen and Palmer 2004), while economic
sustainability is improved by an assumed strengthening of the incentives to work
when contributions to the pension system can be viewed as a form of forced savings
rather than as an ordinary tax (Lindbeck & Persson 2003; Disney 2004).
However, a tight link between lifetime earnings and (expected) pension benefits
is likely to produce a significant gender gap in pensions as long as women continue to
have lower lifetime earnings due to a much higher propensity for part-time work and
lower wage levels compared to men, as is the case also among the present generation
in Norway. While the core of the reformed pension system is an NDC-system in
which pension rights are in principle strictly proportional to lifetime earnings, a
number of mechanisms and additional components contribute to break or weaken the
link between previous earnings and expected pension benefits and hence to deviate
from the principle of perfect actuarial fairness (Lindbeck and Persson 2003). These
redistributive mechanisms and components can be divided into three main groups:
1. General redistributive mechanisms that (are intended to) reduce inequality
in the distribution of benefits as compared to previous earnings. The most
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obvious mechanisms in this category are the social security ceiling on annual
earnings that give rise to pension rights (fixed at 7.1 base amounts or about
1.3 times the average fulltime wage) and an individual guarantee pension that
truncates the distribution of old age pensions from below. The guarantee
pension is comparatively high – with a gross level for a single pensioner at
about 36 percent of an average fulltime wage – and the benefit is tested against
accrued pension rights in the NDC-system with an 80 percent taper. In this
category we can also include the tax system which is particularly mild and
progressive with respect to pensioners and pension income. The rules are so
constructed that pensioners with low incomes (at or just above the guarantee
level) do not pay any income tax, while relatively high marginal tax-rates
apply to pension income in a large interval above the minimum.
2. Specific family/household related redistributive mechanisms. A system for
granting of child credits to parents of children under the age of 6 belongs to
this category. The credits take the form of a guaranteed minimum yearly
pension accrual for one of the parents (almost always the mother) corresponding
to the accrual based on earnings at 80 percent of an average fulltime wage. In
the old system spouses could inherit part of the pension rights of a deceased
spouse and a similar rule is supposed to apply also in the reformed system.3
Finally in this category we include the existing differentiation of the level of
the guarantee pension between married and cohabitating couples on the one
hand and single pensioners on the other. The minimum benefit is somewhat
higher for single pensioners in order to compensate for higher living expenses
per person compared to pensioner couples. This differentiation according to
the household situation of the pensioner has been very significantly reduced in
recent years, but some remains.
3. Finally, we can talk of a category of more latent redistributive mechanisms
related to the fact that the reformed pension system – just like the old system
– provides life-long annuities and is an insurance scheme in which groups with
a relative high life-expectancy participate on equal terms with groups with
a relatively low life-expectancy. In the new system each cohort will have to
pay for its own (estimated) life-expectancy, but the annuity divisor is gender
neutral despite the significant difference in life-expectancy between men and
women. The implicit redistribution from men to women that follows from
3The legislative details of this have yet to be decided. In the present work we assume that the
rules applied to the reformed system will be identical to the rules that have so far been applied in
old system.
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the use of a gender neutral as opposed to a gender specific annuity divisor
is however somewhat reduced due to an explicit under-indexation of running
pension benefits by 0.75 percent. If running benefits had been subject to full
wage indexation, the redistribution embedded in the gender neutral annuity
divisor would have been even stronger (James 2012).
3 Research questions and hypotheses
In this article we set out to investigate the contribution made by the different
components in the reformed system to the expected distributive outcomes of the
system with a primary focus on the gender gap in public pension benefits and income
and economic wellbeing more generally. We also look at the contribution made to
within (gender) group inequality and overall inequality among a pensioner cohort.
Our analysis differs in a number of respects from previous studies of the distributive
implications of the Norwegian pension reform (see for instance Christensen et al.
2012; Fredriksen and Stølen 2014; Nicolajsen and Stølen 2016). Rather than looking
at a cross-section of pensioners in a particular year, we analyse how the new system
for accruing pension rights decides the distribution of pension benefits and economic
well-being among one particular birth cohort, and we look at three different types
of outcomes: the distribution of yearly pension benefits early in the retirement
phase, the distribution of the total sum of pensions received during retirement and
the distribution of average yearly pensions received during the retirement phase.
Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies, we look at not just the distribution of
individually received pension benefits (as in the standard measurement of a gender
gap in pensions), but also at the distribution of equivalised household pension
income. Finally we look at the distribution of a new individual income concept that
avoids the assumption of an equal sharing of resources between couples but takes
account of differences in economies of scale between single and married/cohabitating
pensioners.
All the different components and features of the reformed pensions system that
entail deviation from complete actuarial neutrality are likely to be redistributive to a
varying degree in favour of women as a group. Among the family/household related
mechanisms in group 2, particularly the rather generous system of child credits was
presented and discussed in the reform process as an important “female friendly”
component that would compensate for a closer earnings/benefit link and the removal
of the (presumed) women friendly 20 best year rule (Bay et al. 2015). Rules allowing
spouses to inherit pension rights from each other have also been judged as important
from a female perspective, while the differentiation of the guarantee pension has
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received relatively little attention as a potentially “female friendly” component of
the reformed pension system. However, the effect of these components on within
group inequality among women (and men) and the overall effect on inequality among
a cohort of pensioners is not entirely obvious a-priori.
Concerning the more general redistributive mechanisms in group 1, there is
reason to believe that they too contribute to modify the final distribution of pension
benefits to the advantage of women as a group compared to men. Redistribution from
individuals with high life- time earnings to individuals with low life-time earnings
will typically result in more equality at the group level between men and women, in
addition to reducing the degree of inequality within each respective group (gender).
Finally, the gender neutral annuity divisor with its implicit redistributive effect
in favour of women was simply taken for granted and never questioned in the policy
making process. We expect that it will have a fairly strong redistributive effect in
favour of women, while it should have no effect on the intra group inequality among
men and women, respectively.
With respect to outcomes we expect the gender gap to be small or perhaps even
negative when focussing on the sum of benefits received over the retirement phase,
intermediate when looking at yearly benefits early in retirement, and largest when
defined in terms of the average yearly benefits received over the retirement phase.
Concerning the three alternative income concepts we expect the gender gap to be
largest when measured in terms of individual income, smallest when measured in
terms of equivalised household income and intermediate when measured in terms of
individual income adjusted for economies of scale.
We should emphasise that our aim is purely descriptive and analytical as opposed
to normative. We do not intend to engage in a discussion about the normative
justification for mechanisms and benefit components that entail a deviation from
actuarial fairness. Neither do we want to defend specific ideas about what the ideal
policy target would be in a gender perspective – whether a narrowing of the gender
gap is in and by itself a legitimate policy objective and if so how it should be weighed
against other (potentially) legitimate objectives, like general inequality reduction or
improving work incentives.
It should be pointed out, however, that there are inherent tensions between
compensating women for lower labour market participation and lower wages on the
one hand and stimulating and rewarding women for increasing their investment
in human capital and increasing labour force participation on the other. We see
here a specific version of the more general conflict between equality and efficiency
and between redistribution and labour market incentives (Stålberg et al. 2005).
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Seemingly “female friendly” components of the reformed Norwegian pension system
like the child credits, the right to inherit pension rights after a deceased spouse and
the guarantee pension, all contribute to weaken the pension-related incentives to
labour supply, particularly for women. They also tend to subsidise the pensions
of couples who have divided paid and unpaid work in accordance with traditional
gender roles at the expense of singles and couples who have tended to share both
formal and informal work more equally (Bay et al. 2015). We come back to this
dilemma in the concluding section.
4 Data-source and simulation assumptions
The analysis is done using the Norwegian microsimulation model MOSART. This
is a dynamic microsimulation model that simulates lifetime trajectories for the
entire Norwegian population (see Fredriksen 1998 for an introduction to the model).
The version used starts in 2013, and simulates a wide range of lifetime events and
processes, mainly demographics, educational choices, income and pensions. Up
until 2013 the information about historical events is based on different national
registers such as the Central population register, and registers in the Norwegian
Tax Administration and the Labour and Welfare Service. Transition probabilities
depending on individual characteristics are estimated from observed transitions in
a recent period. Events included in the simulation are migration, deaths, births,
household formation, educational activities, retirement, labour force participation,
income and wealth. Public pension benefits are calculated from the simulated labour
market earnings and other characteristics included in the simulation according to
an accurate description of the public pension system. The pensions covered by the
model include old age pensions, disability pensions, survival pensions and early
retirement benefits. Changes in the pension system may be analysed by calculating
several pension systems in parallel while keeping the stochastic events constant.
We have chosen to follow one specific birth cohort, those born in 1963. By
restricting the analysis to one single birth cohort we avoid the cohort effects that
would usually be present in a cross sectional analysis where the differences between
individuals are influenced by past historical fluctuations that may have had different
impact on different birth cohorts. The 1963-cohort is the first cohort whose pensions
are fully determined by the new system. It is also a cohort for whom we have most of
the crucial demographic decisions and labour income development already resolved.
In 2013 members of this cohort were 50 years old, so the events up till then are
historically determined while the remaining life-course is simulated with respect to
labour earnings and potential divorces, remarriages etc.
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To make the analysis as clean as possible, focusing on how the system for accruing
pension rights affects women and men, we restrict all persons to work until they
are 67 years old, and be retired afterwards, even though the new system allows
for a flexible combination of pensions and earnings between ages 62 and 75 with
full actuarial adjustments for the timing of pension take-up. This is to ensure
that the results are not driven by behavioural adjustments to this feature of the
pension system. As shown by Fredriksen and Stølen 2014, since this new flexibility
was introduced in 2011 men have been much more likely than women to take out
pension rights from age 62 often in combination with continued full-time work, and
as a result of this their annual pension income will be lower and their total income
becomes low when they eventually withdraw from the labour market. Since the
decision to take out pension rights while in full-time work is a voluntary, calculated
act, we believe that the consequences of this choice in terms of lower annual benefits
later in retirement do not belong in a distributive analysis.
We wish to highlight the advantages of sharing incomes between spouses/partners,
and take account of both economies of scale and intra-household redistribution of
income. However, as we want to concentrate on the distributive effects of the pension
system, we set the partner’s labour income to zero and only use the partner’s pension
income in the definition of household income.
5 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 shows the development in sample sizes and demographic characteristics by
age over the entire retirement phase. According to the simulation the 1963 cohort
will consist of 30 771 men and 31 319 women at age 67.4 The bars represent number
of observations and we note how mortality is lower for women than for men so
the decline in sample size is slower for women than for men. The simulated life
expectancy at age 62 is 86 years old for men and 88 years old for women.
Furthermore, the figure shows how the share who are married decreases more
sharply while the share of widows increases faster for women compared to men. In
the early stage of retirement, at age 68, 62 percent of the men and 66 percent of
the women are married. The difference corresponds to a higher share of widows
(8 percent) compared to widowers (3 percent). When reaching age 78 the share
of married women has decreased to 51 percent due to an increase in the share
of widows – going up from 8 to 20 percent. Among males the share of widowers
has gone up from 3 to 8 percent. The higher risk of widowhood among females
4948 individuals have been excluded from the sample if they are registered as married but no
partner can be found in the data – presumably because they live abroad.
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Figure 1. Sample size and demographic characteristics. Development over the
retirement phase.
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Figure 2. The share receiving selected benefit components by age.
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is partly result of their lower mortality compared to men and the tendency for
women to marry/cohabitate with men that are slightly older than themselves (the
age difference is about 2 years in our data on the 1963 cohort). From age 85 (when
more than half of the female cohort are still alive) there are more widowed than
married women, while the corresponding age where the two curves cross for males is
94 years – an age at which only a small minority of males are still alive.
Figure 2 shows how the fraction receiving inherited pension rights is much higher
for women than men and increasing with age. At age 88 – the average life-expectancy
at age 62 for this cohort of women – almost 40 percent will receive inherited pension
rights according to our simulations. The corresponding figure for males at this age
is below 10 percent. The two other benefits shown in the graph are the guarantee
pension for married/cohabitating pensioners (low rate) and the guarantee pension
for singles (high rate). Women more often receive guarantee pension than men
and at younger ages typically at the lower rate applied to married/cohabitating
pensioners. Over time – as many female guarantee pensioners lose their spouse –the
share receiving guarantee pension at the low rate declines, while the share receiving
the high rate increases. Among males the share receiving guarantee pensions (both
high and low rate) tends to decline, primarily as a result of selective mortality.
Richer pensioners tend to live longer than their poorer peers.
Other important benefit components – like child credits and whether pension
accrual has been affected by the income ceiling - are pre-determined and thus vary
by age insofar as there is different mortality among the recipients. For instance, the
fractions receiving guarantee pension is declining since low income individuals have
higher mortality than high income individuals.
Not shown in the figure are the fractions receiving child credits and the fraction
affected by the upper earnings limit. These fractions are high and quite stable over
the remaining lifespan. Among men, approximately 70 percent reaches the upper
earnings limit at some point in their working career. The corresponding figure for
women is 40 percent. For child credits we have an opposite situation, since the
majority of women (76 percent) have at some point in their life acquired some
compensation of their pension rights because of care for children (or other family
members). The model also simulates child credits to 31 percent of the men, although
in reality it is likely to be closer to zero. Child credits are only given to one of the
parents, and according to the rules it should be attributed to the one with income
lower than the specified limit. In reality, the points are always given to the mother,
and if the father is the rightful recipient, he must actively apply for a correction.
We believe that very few do so. Therefore, the (modest) pension supplement given
15
to men because of care for children is likely to be overestimated in the model.
6 Analytic strategy
Our distributional analysis is done in a step-wise fashion. At the outset we simulate
a hypothetical pension system that lacks all redistributive elements. Pension rights
are proportional to lifetime earning without an upper limit.5 Thereafter, we add
each of the redistributive elements in steps: the gender neutral annuity divisor, the
ceiling on annual earnings, the child credits, the right to inherit pension rights from
a diseased spouse, the minimum guarantee pension (but without higher rates for
single pensioners), the guarantee pension with higher rate to single pensioners, and
finally, tax on pension income. Here follows a closer description of the redistributive
components that are added at each respective step of the analysis:
Step 0. Baseline. In the baseline version of the reformed pension system all
redistributive components have been removed and we have applied gender specific
annuity divisors taking account of estimated differences in life-expectancy between
men and women in this cohort (about two years). This hypothetical pension system
can be said to represent the ideal of perfect actuarial fairness where expected
benefits (taking account of gender differences in longevity) are proportional to
lifetime earnings.
Step 1. Gender neutral annuity divisor. In the next step we introduce the
gender neutral annuity divisor that is actually applied in the reformed system. This
hypothetical step reproduces the distribution of lifetime earnings in terms of annual
pension benefits.
Step 2. Social security ceiling. In this step we take account of the fact that only
annual earnings up to 7.1 base-amounts (about 1.3 times the average full time wage)
give rise to pension rights. Since men tend to have higher annual earnings than
women, we expect that the ceiling will reduce the gender gap in pensions/pension
income as well as reduce overall inequality.
Step 3. Child credits. At this step we add child credits. The credits take the
form of a yearly guaranteed minimum pension accrual for one of the parents of
children below the age of six (as well as other carers). The parent with the lowest
earnings is guaranteed a yearly pension accrual in the relevant year corresponding
to annual earnings of 4.5 base-amounts (about 80% of an average fulltime wage).
5Ideally, we would have based it on lifetime earnings only. Unfortunately, the model did not
allow for a separation of the different income components, thus earnings include also taxable
social security benefits that do actually count in the accrual of pension rights. In this respect a
distributional element is already in place, before our analysis begins.
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Step 4. Inherited pension rights. According to the rules applied in the old system
(that we assume will be adopted also in the reformed system), a widow/widower
is entitled to earnings-related pension benefits equal to at least 55% of the sum of
the earnings-related benefits received by the couple before the spouse’s death. If
the individual pension rights of the survivor exceeds this limit no addition with be
granted.
Step 5. Guarantee pension without higher benefits for singles. The guarantee
pension secures a comparatively high minimum benefit to individuals with low
earnings-related entitlements. The benefit is tested against NDC-pension rights
with an 80 percent taper. The benefit guarantee for pensioners living with a partner
(married or cohabitating) is fixed at 1.85 base-amounts and in this step we apply
this level also to single pensioners.
Step 6. Guarantee pension with higher benefits for singles. In this step we
introduce the actual differentiation of the guarantee whereby the benefit for single
pensioners is raised to 2 base-amounts.
Step 7. After tax. In this step we apply income taxation according to current
rules. The taxation of pensioners and pension income was modified in connection
with the pension reform of 2011. The reformed system is highly progressive and
designed to secure that pensioners living on minimum benefits do not pay any income
tax.
The sequence in which the different components are entered is crucial for the
results obtained. We believe, however, that the chosen sequence is the only possible
given the intention to provide a consistent decomposition of the total redistributive
effect obtained by the system compared to the benchmark system. The criterion
used for establishing the sequence is that benefit components placed towards the
end are distributed according to rules that take account of benefits distributed
in earlier stages. For instance, the minimum guarantee pension is granted given
the total accrual of NDC pension rights, including child credits and any inherited
pension rights, while the entitlement to child credits does not depend on any of the
subsequent elements. A possible alternative approach would be to look at the net
effect of removing one component at a time while taking account of compensatory
changes in other components. For instance, removing the child credits would mean
that more individuals would be entitled to higher amounts of guarantee pension
and the net effect would be smaller than the gross effect that is estimated by the
sequential approach. The problem with this “partial” approach is that the estimated
effects of the respected components will not add up to the total redistributive effect
of all components combined. For selected benefit components we will, however, also
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present the net effects of a partial removal of the component.
As we have already pointed out, we are primarily concerned with how different
components in the Norwegian pension system affect the gender gap in pensions but
we are also interested in inequality among the two genders and overall. The gender
gap in pensions and pension income can be seen as a between-group component in
overall inequality, while the average of inequality among male and female pensioners
can be seen as a measure of within group inequality, and the two are components in
the overall level of inequality in pension income.
When analysing the gender gap and inequality we consider three alternative
statistics. Annual pension income is the most conventional of the three and here
we measure at age 70, i.e. at an early stage in the retirement phase. Total pension
income is the sum of all incomes received over the retirement period, deflated by a
wage index.6 Finally we look at average pension income which is the total income
divided by the number of retirement years (for an earlier contribution see Pedersen
1999: 380). The latter is our preferred outcome statistic because it takes account
of income conditions experienced over the entire retirement age, but less driven by
differences in longevity.7
Finally we use three alternative definitions of pension income: individual pension
income, equalized household pension income (using the modified OECD-scale), and
individual income adjusted for economies of scale. While the first is conventionally
used in analyses of the distribution of pension benefits and the gender gap in pensions
in particular, the second is the conventional choice in poverty and (income) inequality
research. The third alternative definition is a novel concept that – as far as we
know – has not been suggested and used before. It differs from equalized household
income by adjusting individual income with a factor defined equal to the number
of household members divided by the number of household units. In the case of
two household members and using the modified OECD-scale, this factor will be
2/1.5 = 1.33. The conventional equalizing of incomes takes into account that due to
economies of scale in consumption, a couple do not need to have a joint income that
is two times as high as a single person to obtain the same level of living. However,
the concept assumes equal sharing of incomes and expenses within the household
and therefore equalizes any initial income differences between husband and wife.
6We do not use present values of future income since the timing of pension benefits is not
relevant in this setting. Receiving pensions in the form of an annuity represents an alternative
cost to the individual because total pension benefits received in the form of a lump sum payment
at retirement would have yielded future interest. The expected present value of future pension
benefits is therefore a more relevant concept when comparing different types of income streams or
different types of wealth.
7It is somewhat driven by longevity through the under-indexation of annual benefits.
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Since we are concerned with the pension gap, also between spouses, the traditional
method of household equivalent income is inadequate. Our alternative measure is a
more stylized concept that retains income differences within the couple, while at the
same time take into account the gains of economy of scale with respect to expenses.
7 Results
We start by showing each of the redistributive elements’ quantitative effect on
(individual) average pension income over retirement for men and women respectively.
As shown by Table 1, we estimate that for the 1963 cohort a hypothetical actuarially
fair pension system would produce a gender gap of 43%, while the actual reformed
system produces a gender gap of only 7% after taking account of income taxation.
Table 1. Individual pension benefits. Average over the retirement phase.
Average amount
at each step in NOK Gender
Men Women gap
0. Baseline 268,164 154,176 43%
1. Gender neutral annuity divisor 242,600 168,341 31%
2. Social security ceiling 206,926 158,741 23%
3. Child credits 209,087 174,748 16%
4. Inherited benefits 209,726 181,298 14%
5. Guarantee pension undifferentiated 214,718 191,563 11%
6. Guarantee w/higher benefits for singles 215,891 193,815 10%
7. Income taxes 189,320 175,459 7%
Change compared to
previous step in NOK Change in
Men Women gender gap
0. Baseline - -
1. Gender neutral annuity divisor -25,654 14,166 -12%
2. Social security ceiling -35,674 -9,600 -7%
3. Child credits 2,161 16,007 -7%
4. Inherited benefits 639 6,549 -3%
5. Guarantee pension undifferentiated 4,992 10,265 -3%
6. Guarantee w/higher benefits for singles 1,173 2,252 -1%
7. Income taxes -26,571 -18,356 -3%
Compared to the baseline system, the gender neutral annuity divisor reduces
the annual pensions received by men and increases the annual benefits received by
women, and altogether the effect is a decrease in the gender gap by 12 percentage
points to 31%. The social security ceiling reduces the average benefits received by
19
Table 2. Contribution by child credits and inherited pension rights to average
pensions for men and women and the gender gap – gross and net effects in NOK
and change in gender gap.
Stepwise Partial
(gross) effect Change in (net) effect Change in
Men Women gender gap Men Women gender gap
Child credits 2,161 16,007 -7% 1,393 7,137 -3%
Inherited pension
rights 639 6,549 -3% 564 7,013 -3%
both men and women, but the reduction is much more severe among men. And the
result is a further reduction in the gender gap by 7 percentage points to 23%. The
system of child credits has a further substantial effect in narrowing the gender gap
with 7 percentage points to 20%. As already mentioned this should be considered a
lower bound estimate since the estimated average amount received by males due to
child credits is likely to be somewhat overestimated. The possibility to take over
pension rights from a deceased spouse reduces the gender gap with 3 percentage
points on average. It raises the average amount of pension benefits received by
female pensioners by 6500 NOK, but one should remember that most of the women
who benefit from this only do it for a part of their retirement phase. The impact for
those who do benefit the effect is much larger in the years spent in widowhood.
The guarantee pension reduces the gap by altogether 4 percentage points of
which the differentiation in favour of single pensioners (step 6) is responsible for
1 percentage point. Finally income taxation reduces disposable income for both
men and women, but the progressivity of taxation implies that the relative effect is
stronger for men, reducing the gender gap by 3 percentage points.
In the political debate on the Norwegian pension reform, child credits and (to a
smaller extent) the right to take over pension rights from a deceased spouse were
discussed as women friendly (family related) components in the system. The results
in table 1 indicate that child credits are the more important component of the two,
but this hinges at least partly on the chosen sequence. Without child credits the
effect of the right to inherit benefits would have been stronger, and it is possible that
the two benefit components interact with the guarantee pension in different ways.
In order to test for this we have for these two components calculated also the partial
(net) effect of removing the component while leaving the other components in place
and allowing them to automatically compensate for the removal. The results are
shown in table 2.
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The partial contribution of child credits to average pension would be 7,137 NOK
for women, which is considerably lower than the stepwise (gross) contribution of
16,000 NOK, and the net effect on the gender gap is only 3 percentage points due
to automatic compensation effects from increased inherited pension rights and the
guarantee pension. From this perspective the two family related benefit components
have rather similar effects on the gender gap.
Figure 3. Gender gap and within gender Gini-inequality for three outcome measures
and three alternative income concepts. Stepwise analysis.
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In Figure 3 we present results from the stepwise analysis for the three outcomes
(annual income at age 70, average income over retirement, and the sum of income
received over retirement) multiplied by our three alternative income concepts (in-
dividually received pensions, individual pensions adjusted for economies of scale
and equivalised sum of household pensions). The vertical axis shows the gender gap
while the horizontal axis shows the weighted average of Gini-inequality measured
for males and females respectively. Note that the axis has been turned so that it
runs from high to lower Gini-values.
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As is apparent in the figure, all the redistributive elements cause the gender
gap to shrink. In addition most of the elements also cause a lower within-group
inequality in income. By construction, going from a gender specific to a gender
neutral divisor does not change the income inequality within each gender group, but
the gender neutral annuity divisor is the redistributive component that contributes
the most to reducing the gender gap in pensions compared to the baseline system
with a gender specific annuity divisors. The redistributive element that contributes
the most to reducing within-group inequality is the ceiling on earnings. As noted
earlier, this ceiling affected 70 percent of the men and 40 percent of the women in
our simulation.
The profiles are very similar across the different outcome measures and income
concepts. However, while the right to take over pension rights from a deceased
spouse/partner has a very small impact on annual incomes at age 70, the effect
becomes more substantial when looking at the average over the retirement phase
(both on the gap and on intra-gender inequality). Another difference to note is that
the child credits have a smaller impact when looking at equivalised household income
compared to the individual income concepts. Apart from that, the graphs appear to
differ mostly in terms of the resulting level of the gender gap and inequality. In order
to highlight these differences we complete our presentation of results by showing
three tables summarising the final outcomes in terms of the gender gap (table 3),
intra-gender inequality (table 4), and overall inequality (table 5).
Table 3. Gender gap in disposable pensions.
Annual income Sum over Mean over
at age 70 retirement retirement
Individual pensions 8% 1% 7%
Equivalised household pensions 1% -2% 4%
Individual pensions adjusted
for economies to scale 10% 3% 9%
As shown in table 4, the resulting gender gap in disposable pensions is everywhere
positive except for the middle cell that refers to the sum over retirement of equivalised
household pensions. In line with a-priori expectations, the gender gap is small or
negative in all the cells of the second column looking at the sum of benefits received
over retirement and the reason is of course that women tend to live longer than men
and receive benefits for a longer time. The gender gap is, however, somewhat larger
when incomes are measured annually in the first and the third columns – either
early in retirement or as an average over the retirement phase - and particularly
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it is larger in the four corner cells that refer to individual income with or without
adjustment for economies of scale.
The outcomes illustrate how the different definitions operate. We see that
the gender gap is small when measured in terms of equivalised household income.
Equalization of incomes within couples basically means that the gender gap is driven
entirely by single households. Single persons have a lower gender gap at age 70 than
all persons since the economies of scale within couples allow the wife to work less.
Conversely, with our new concept – individual income adjusted for economies of scale
– the gender gap becomes higher than the conventional individual income concept
because the gain from economies to scale is accounted for explicitly in addition to
the actual income gap between men and women (both single and married). Looking
at sum and mean over retirement the adjustment for economies of scale produces a
larger gender gap than the standard individual income concept because it captures
the fact that females tend to spend a higher fraction of the retirement phase as
singles (widows). Apparently the associated loss of economies of scale is not fully
compensated by the reformed system despite the right to inherit pension rights and
the remaining differentiation of the minimum pension guarantee.
Table 4. Intra-gender Gini-inequality in disposable pensions.
Annual income Sum over Mean over
at age 70 retirement retirement
Individual pensions .085 .214 .082
Equivalised household pensions .118 .215 .099
Individual pensions adjusted
for economies to scale .118 .220 .124
Intra-gender inequality is affected differently by the definitions of income. Both
equivalised pensions and pensions adjusted for economies to scale represent an
upward revision of married women’s incomes relative to single women’s income,
thus increasing intra-gender inequality. Intra-gender inequality in pension income is
significantly higher for the “sum over retirement” outcome compared to the other
outcome statistics measuring annual pension income. The explanation is social
inequalities in life-expectancy that tend to correlate with lifetime earnings and
accumulated pension rights. The rich tend to live longer and receive benefits for
more years and taking this into account adds to the inequalities found in annual
incomes. Comparing across the three income concepts we find that within gender
inequality tends to be highest for individual pensions adjusted for economies of
scale.
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Table 5. Overall Gini-inequality in disposable pensions.
Annual income Sum over Mean over
at age 70 retirement retirement
Individual pensions .091 .214 .087
Equivalised household pensions .118 .215 .100
Individual pensions adjusted
for economies to scale .124 .221 .165
Overall Gini-inequality in the distribution of pension income will reflect both
the gender gap (between gender inequality) and within gender inequality. The
results shown in table 5 can therefore be expected to be a simple positive function
of the results shown in the two previous tables. Looking at our preferred outcome
statistic, the distribution of mean annual pensions over retirement, we find that
Gini-inequality is highest for individual income adjusted for economies of scale,
reflecting the fact that both the gender gap and within gender inequality is high for
this income concept.
8 Conclusion and discussion
Although the core of the reformed Norwegian pension system is built on the Notional
Defined Contribution model and designed to achieve a close link between life-time
earnings and expected pension benefits received over the retirement phase, a series of
redistributive components ensure that the gender gap in pensions is very significantly
reduced. Looking at individual pension income, the projected gender gap in average
benefits received over the retirement phase for the 1963 cohort is reduced from 43% -
the projected outcome of a hypothetical actuarially fair system – to only 7% with all
the redistributive components in place, including the progressive system of pensioner
taxation.
As expected, the final gender gap is smaller or even negative when looking
at the sum of future benefits received over the retirement phase, and it tends to
be smaller when looking at household equivalised income rather than individual
income. The largest gender gap appears when we apply our new income concept:
individual income adjusted for economies of scale. When this income concept is
used in combination with our preferred outcome indicator (average yearly income
received over the retirement phase) we find an after tax gender gap of 9%. The
gap is somewhat larger when using our new income concept rather than the the
conventional individual income concept because the former is sensitive to the fact
that female pensioners can expect to spend a longer retirement phase as widows and
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hence with the loss of economies to scale.
Our hypotheses for the effect of the different redistributive components are
largely born out. The gender neutral annuity divisor gives the single most important
contribution to close the gender gap, and the difference between a gender specific
and a gender neutral annuity divisor would in fact have been even larger if benefits
had been fully indexed with wages over the retirement phase. The redistributive
effect of the gender neutral annuity divisor tends to be taken for granted since
the introduction of a gender specific annuity divisor in the public pension system
has never been seriously discussed. A fully proportional pension system with a
gender neutral annuity divisor produces a gender gap in average annual income
during retirement of about 30% for individual income and 20 percent for equivalised
household income.
Among those components that we have classified as generally redistributive (from
rich to poor) the income ceiling appears to be the most important followed by the
guarantee pension and the tax system. An important caveat here is that the two
latter components would have had a stronger impact without the other redistributive
components in place.
Among the last group of redistributive components that we labelled family/household
related, child credits have the strongest effect followed by inherited pension rights
and the differentiation of the guarantee pension. Again – as we have seen – the
sequence plays a role here. The size of pension rights derived from a deceased
spouse/partner are reduced as a result of child credits received by the survivor
and hence removing the child credits would to a certain degree be automatically
compensated by higher inherited pension rights and higher guarantee pensions. The
partial (net) effect of removing the child credits is therefore much smaller and about
the same as the corresponding effect of removing the right to inherit benefits.
The family/household related benefits tend to reduce intra-gender inequalities
as well as closing the gender gap. In particular the child credits have a fairly strong
inequality reducing effect (particularly among women, of course), but also here it is
likely that a significant share of the redistribution achieved would be automatically
taken over by the guarantee pension if the child credits were simply removed.
The child credits and the right to inherit pension rights from a deceased spouse
have been recognized and discussed as particularly “women friendly” components
of the reformed system, and this study confirms that they do indeed help to close
the gender gap in pensions. However, an alternative notion of women-friendliness
and alternative criteria against which to evaluate the pension system would be to
require that the pension system provides equally strong incentives to labour supply
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for women compared to men, and to demand that the system does not systematically
favour couples that distribute formal and informal work in line with traditional
gender roles.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed empirical analysis of
the incentive structure created by the reformed system, but a few observations can
be made a priori. The gender neutral annuity divisor and the ceiling on earnings
can be assumed to perform well also in terms of this alternative ideal because the
first directly strengthens the incentives to work and earn pension rights for women
relative to men, while the second weakens the pension incentives more for men than
women.
The two women friendly components, however, perform very badly on this
dimension as they systematically weaken the labour supply incentives, particularly
for women. The child credits effectively remove almost all pension incentives to
participate in gainful employment for women with children below six years of age.
Rules that allow the survivor to inherit pension rights from a deceased spouse/partner
also tend to weaken work incentives, particularly for women, and they systematically
favour couples with and unequal sharing of life-time earnings and NDC-pension
rights.
There is a further paradox here, however. We have already noted that the net
effect on the gender gap of removing the two family components will be smaller than
the gross effect because the removal will be partly compensated by the guarantee
pension. This observation also applies to the incentive side of the coin. The
improvement of the incentive structure that can be obtained by removing the two
family related components will be reduced because of the automatic compensation by
the guarantee pension. The guarantee pension weakens the incentive to participate
in the labour market for the entire lower part of the earnings distribution where
women are strongly overrepresented.
So while the reformed Norwegian pension system performs comparatively well
in terms of closing the gender gap in pensions, it does so partly thanks to benefit
components that weaken the incentives for women to work and reward couples
who chose an unbalanced sharing of informal and formal work in accordance with
traditional gender roles.
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